OIA Request - Where's the science?
Are we observing the cherry-picking and side-lining of the scientific literature throughout the COVID-19 event, or is a body of methodical analyses & reviews tucked away somewhere?
OFFICIAL INFORMATION ACT REQUEST JUNE 17 2022
This Official Information Act request comprises 3 parts, a background to the request, a summary of institutions with authority and involvement in the production of information and knowledge that is used to underpin policy and therefore legislation throughout the COVID-19 event, and the material request for information (page 9).
This request has been deliberately sent to four entities: the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Hon Chris Hipkins, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. This is undertaken so that they may all confirm what information and data relating to this request is held with that institution or with the Minister in order to inform the greater public. This is made to prevent the transfer of the request; to shed some light on rather opaque reasoning processes, in order to establish where such information is held across government.
1. The COVID-19 Public Health Response Bill was established overnight with no public consultation, May 13th, 2020. An extraordinary tumult of legislation has been and continues to be released from the Parliamentary Counsel Office, without public or Parliamentary scrutiny and oversight.
2. Civil society must assume that the legislation, which has the full force of the primary Act, is underpinned by robust scientific evidence.
3. The processes followed, and actions taken over the COVID-19 event may serve as an indication of future responses to future events.
4. The New Zealand population trust that decision-making will prioritise the public interest; that principles of proportionality apply; so as to protect public health across the population.
5. Robust scientific evidence is required to both justify rights-limiting mandates, surveillance activities, and safety and efficacy claims, but also to identify the budgetary burden of the measures and rolling orders.
6. Over the COVID-19 event (Jan 2020-June 2022) I have been unable to find reports and surveillance of the peer reviewed scientific literature that would act to underpin critical points of policy and the ongoing (delegated, or secondary legislation) Orders blitzkrieg. Such evidence would demonstrate that the machinery of government response is appropriate to the risk indicated in the scientific literature.
7. There is no evidence of a scientific cohort in New Zealand tasked with surveillance of the published and peer reviewed scientific literature, as signals that have directly informed and underpinned the New Zealand response to COVID-19, and importantly, the production of primary and secondary legislation. Such signals would include
a. Evidence on safety and efficacy of mRNA genetic vaccines by age group, by gender, for pregnant women and by health status;
b. Evidence on the role of natural immunity and shift to endemic status; a. Evidence on the safety and efficacy of mRNA genetic vaccines, particularly in relation to potential accumulation of the spike protein (the target antigen) that appears to persist beyond 6 months (see also (20):
i. Post infection with Sars-Cov-2
ii. Ongoing exposure to boosters
b. Evidence assessing the cost-benefit ratio of possible safe and low-cost alternatives to mRNA genetic vaccines to prevent hospitalisation and death from COVID-19 for at risk groups. This includes early ambulatory treatments using repurposed drugs and nutrients with a long history of safe use;
c. Evidence on safety and efficacy of clinical guidelines for hospitalised patients, and the evidence for off-patent and repurposed drugs and nutrients with a long history of safe use.
8. Reviews such as described (7) of the international data are of the essence, because
a. firstly, workers are mandated to receive repeat injections;
b. secondly doctors are investigated if their scripts deviate from government guidelines for treating patients protectively or with severe COVID-19;
c. thirdly, the vaccine is a novel genetic vaccine, containing the instructions for the body to produce a spike protein, are safe and effective; and
d. fourthly, ongoing secondary legislation continues to be released that presumes infection rates are a proxy for risk, and which increase onerous obligations for the general public.
9. Such a scientific cohort would be at arm’s length from the Ministries and Ministers who have arranged all contracts for supply of vaccines. This is because there is the potential that scientific advice could contradict assurances of safety and efficacy of the mRNA vaccine; and because such advice could impact embedded and key strategic aims of Cabinet.
10. Science advice is about making choices between options, and balancing risk, complexity, cost and benefit. As Sir Peter Gluckman has noted, there are many sources of evidence – tradition, prior belief, anecdote and observation, and science. Sir Peter has also noted that science is always changing; it is often locked in disciplinary silos and science is not values free, and that ‘biggest value judgments in science are the quality and sufficiency of data on which to reach a conclusion.’
11. There is no accessible place where the scholarly literature appears to be rigorously reviewed, forming a body of evidence. As Gluckman has noted, ‘Policy is rarely determined by evidence, but policy can be and should be informed by evidence.’
12. The New Zealand population is underserved by a civil service that prioritises modelling which excludes or ignores relevant parameters, such as age stratified risk; the limitations of vaccine efficacy demonstrated by the endpoints in the clinical trials; potential for waning, breakthrough and failure; the novelty of the technology; risk from repeat exposures; and the role of natural immunity.
13. The New Zealand population is underserved by a civil service that fails to take into account relevant considerations, and produces narrowly framed papers which serve a predetermined endpoint of mass vaccination across the New Zealand population.
14. Section [B] illustrates that I have attempted to find this information and understand key institutions and actors in the COVID-19 response, and their relevant purposes and whether they have produced such information.
15. Transparency & accountability: Orders underpinned by robust scientific evidence.
16. Ignorance has real world impact. We understand that current guidelines limit doctors, and as reports to the Medical Council are now common, these guidelines produce a chilling effect, as rules clinicians are unlikely to deviate from. It is not clear that the scientific literature is independently surveilled to understand whether the drugs used in hospitals, meaningfully prevent hospitalisation and death.
17. Lacking autonomy, lacking choice and a safe democratic quorum, the guidelines may lack the reflexivity and insight that can reflect and protect individuals who present with complex conditions. Repurposed drugs and nutritional supplements should have a decision-making profile (such as the Bradford Hill Criteria) that are less restrictive than new drug oversight, as they have a long history of safe use and are generally much less costly. This has not occurred throughout the COVID-19 event and cherry-picking of scientific studies appear to occur, rather than larger reviews of the literature, to exclude these treatments.
18. However, there appears to be substantial money allocated to ongoing boosters. $473 million is set aside for a fourth booster.
19. There are other barriers to inclusion of treatments in guidelines that ensure issues are not parsed by current institutional structures. For example, for ivermectin to be added as an indicated treatment would require that the sponsor (Merck) would submit an application. As Merck has other more profitable drugs listed by Pharmac, it is unlikely the sponsor would take such action. Therefore, such action to include non-indicated treatments would involve the balancing of evidence from the peer reviewed scientific literature and the independent action of the Ministry of Health.
20. We can see how scientific ignorance arising from an absence of an independent place where this work might be undertaken, translates to ignorance, confusion and fear in the media and general population. This then impacts judgement decisions in the High Court. We can see how Justice Cooke, with the best will in the world, has conflated infection with harm, yet it is clear from the scientific literature that infection does not directly associate with individual or population level risk. Other judges appear unwilling to enter this fray, and I thank Cooke for having the courage to accept this role.
21. However, conflating infection with harm in judicial decisions; in secondary legislation; and in the New Zealand legacy media; demonstrates that those not at risk of infection are then placed at disproportionate risk from the genetic vaccine.
22. The principle of informed consent makes allowance for the established truism that all medicine carries risk. What we then occurs, politically, medically and socially, is a reluctance or disinclination to explore the implications of repeat injections of a medical intervention, and I quote from my April paper:
‘Papers continue to be published that draw attention to both long- and short-term risk arising following exposure to the vaccine technologies. For example, the genetic vaccines may potentially induce an autoimmune response. Global vaccination may create the perfect environment for vaccine driven virulence evolution - antigenic escape where ‘variants of target antigens evolve because they enable pathogens that are otherwise less fit to evade vaccine-induced immunity. The evolution of escape variants has been frequently observed.’. Immune function may be altered. An increasing body of literature outlines that spike protein may play a primary role in post vaccination events. A study recently revealed that following vaccination, the spike protein persists in the lymph nodes for 8 weeks. The spike protein can persist for 9 months following infection, but how the spike protein persists in the body following repeat injections, in an uncontrolled environment remains unclear.’
23. However, it is not evident that responsible and rather obvious protocols have been followed in order to determine whether this expenditure is the most evidence-based choice, whether for (sic general) population of the New Zealand public or our must vulnerable groups; or whether there are alternative solutions that have not been parsed. It does not appear that such scientific scrutiny has not been undertaken prior to this announcement.
24. A traditional simple OIA request cannot parse such complex issues that are in the public interest. However, with real fear in the population of hospitalisation and death following a series of exposures to the mRNA genetic vaccine, and increasing knowledge that the vaccines are less safe than claimed, and have a short efficacy period, it is critical that the public understand where such information that directs policy is held.
25. Robust scientific evidence would be based on frequent, rolling reviews of the scientific literature to inform the Ministries and whole of government response, and demonstrate to the public that processes appropriate governance were in place, such as:
a. The changing profile (virulence and pathogenicity) of Sars-Cov-2 respiratory virus;
b. New evidence relating to the symptoms of COVID-19 (thrombotic, viral, autoimmune, neuropathic etc), by age group, by gender, for pregnant women and by health status;
c. Data on the potential for the mRNA genetic vaccines boosters to prevent hospitalisation and death;
d. Data exploring excess population level mortality (as opposed to mortality directly resulting from COVID-19);
e. The potential for the mRNA genetic vaccines to: induce clotting, promote autoimmune responses, to reactivate latent viruses, to induce Mast Cell Activation Syndrome, and impair mitochondrial function.
f. Risk from the genetic code being installed in the body (including in the immune cells and monocytes) and the persistence of this genetic code and risk to population health.
g. Risk of persistent exposure to the spike protein due to accumulation in the body through repeat vaccination and infection.
h. Post-vaccine treatment to advance healing from adverse reactions.
26. Such information should form the knowledge architecture, the rationale for new secondary legislation Orders. It would underpin these Orders in order to promote public trust in that processes are transparent and accountable.
[B] INSTITUTIONS TASKED WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION AND FOR REVIEWING SCIENCE IN COVID-19
27. Key groups have been established to carry out the functions of navigating New Zealand through the COVID-19 event with relation to the knowledge and information relating to risk and population health and the production of related policy.
28. The Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet. The COVID-19 group is a business unit of the DPMC and is mandated to coordinate and where necessary lead, the All-of-government response to the ongoing pandemic. The group has four main functions:
a. Strategy and Policy. This function:
· provides advice to Ministers regarding COVID-19 response system settings.
· advises on and drafts Alert Level changes.
· considers the impact of changes to the system (including settings, virus evolution, external factors etc.)
· provides support for the COVID-19 Ministerial Group.
b. System Assurance and Continuous Improvement. This function:
· provides assurance to Ministers and Chief Executives that the COVID-19 response system settings are working as intended.
· develops, implements and maintains a system wide risk management framework for the response.
· identifies areas for improvement across the response system.
· engages with iwi, community and business regarding the response, bringing a range of perspectives to the Group’s advice.
c. Systems Readiness and Planning. This function: · works across the system to respond to active cases.
· ensures system readiness to respond to cases or changes in policy settings.
· develops and tests system-wide scenario-based plans (e.g. for resurgence).
d. Communications and Public Engagement. This function:
· develops and delivers public communication messages regarding the COVID-19 response, including the Unite Against COVID-19 campaign.
· engages with COVID-19 response agencies regarding key messages for the public both nationally and regionally.
e. The business units responsibilities include:
Data analytics, monitoring, reporting and insights - including coordinated reporting to provide a tested, robust and consistent source of information, and provide agencies with cross government developed modelling and operational trends.
29. Ministry of Health
There is little information demonstrating decision-making based on risk in the scientific literature. Ministry of Health Science and Technical Advisory group, headed by Ian Chief science advisor. Information on the science relating to COVID-19 can be found on the page COVID-19: Science news. Information on this page includes/has included
a. Variant updates
b. A request for advice on the summary of evidence of COVID-19, transmission risk and vaccination in 5-11 year olds. The advice does not consider alternative non-mRNA treatments, nor judge the proportionate risk of hospitalisation and death from adverse events following the mRNA genetic vaccine, versus following COVID-19. It is unclear on the risk benefit profile of exposure of healthy children to the treatment.
c. June 2020. Guidance for the rehabilitation of people with or recovering from COVID-19 in Aotearoa New Zealand.
d. COVID-19 Science Updates May 2021. Aerosol transmission of SARS-CoV-2.
e. COVID-19 Science Updates Jul 9 2021. Pharmaceutical treatments (therapeutics) for COVID-19 – current evidence and uncertainties.
f. COVID-19 Science Updates. September 13 2021. No evidence that COVID-19 vaccination is associated with increased risk of miscarriage.
g. Ministry of Health (2022, Feb, 4). Clinical Management of COVID-19 in Hospitalised Adults (including in pregnancy).
30. The Minister for COVID-19 response, Chris Hipkins.
a. The COVID19.govt.nz website contains information relating to the COVID-19 response. However there are no reviews of the scientific literature.
b. The OIA request pages do not include any information on research relating to the safety and efficacy of the vaccines, nor early treatment.
c. COVID-19 Independent Continuous Review, Improvement and Advice Group: advice to the Minister for the COVID-19 Response on specific areas of the response where improvements could be made with the benefit of alternative and independent perspectives. However there is no requirement in the Terms of Reference to consider whether the group’s recommendations are based on evidence in the published literature:
i. The purpose of the Group is to provide advice to the Minister for the COVID-19 Response on specific areas of the response where improvements could be made with the benefit of alternative and independent perspectives.
ii. The Group could; a. Consider the current COVID-19 response efforts across the Government’s systemwide response, encompassing border, managed isolation and quarantine, and public health response; and b. Provide an ongoing independent perspective on the robustness of the COVID-19 response system and opportunities for continuous improvement on specific aspects of the response to give the Minister assurance that the necessary learnings have been recorded and implemented by agencies.
d. Reporting of the progress on recommendations to improve the COVID-19 response system does not include reviews of the scientific literature to feedback into this reporting system.
31. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment is the lead agency for the COVID-19 Strategy Taskforce.
a. A COVID-19 Vaccine Strategy Taskforce has been established to oversee implementation of the vaccine strategy. The interagency taskforce consists of:
i. the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (as the lead agency)
ii. the Ministry of Health and its regulatory agency Medsafe
iv. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
v. A Science and Technical Advisory Group (STAG) supports the taskforce with expert advice about the vaccine strategy work.
b. The taskforce comprises of planning and delivery groups. These groups are not required to balance or judge risk relating to treatment during COVID-19:
i. COVID-19 Immunisation Programme Governance Group (IPGG) - oversight and assurance body. They will oversee progress on purchasing, sequencing and delivery of any successful COVID-19 vaccines.
ii. COVID-19 Vaccine and Immunisation Programme Steering Group (SG) - programme decision making and provides direction and oversight to the programme team regarding strategic risks, issues and opportunities.
iii. COVID-19 Immunisation Implementation Advisory Group (IIAG) - advice to the Ministry of Health on how to plan, prepare and implement a COVID-19 immunisation campaign.
iv. COVID-19 Vaccine Independent Safety Monitoring Board (CV-ISMB) - provides advice to the Centre for Adverse Reactions Monitoring (CARM), Medsafe and the Ministry of Health on the safety of the COVID-19 vaccine(s).
The CV-ISMB is not tasked to review the scientific literature and make inferences or associations with the New Zealand; nor to suggest any alternative to vaccines.
The purpose and function of the Board is to provide expert advice on the safety of the COVID-19 vaccine(s) to the Centre for Adverse Reactions Monitoring (CARM), Medsafe, the CVIP and the Ministry of Health during the rollout across Aotearoa New Zealand.
The focus for the board is to assess causal links between reported adverse events, and to consider potential safety signals under investigation.
The CVIP’s purpose is to make the best use of any vaccines, to support the immediate health response and to help achieve the COVID-19 vaccine strategy longer-term outcomes which include (NB. apologies for absence of tab capability):
• sufficient supply of a safe and effective vaccine to achieve population immunity to COVID-19, affordably
• protection for Māori, Pacific peoples, and population groups at particular risk from COVID-19,
• full cultural, social and economic recovery from the impacts of COVID-19,
• recognition of New Zealand as a valued contributor to global wellbeing and the COVID19 response,
• New Zealand, Pacific and global preparedness for response to future disease outbreaks.
32. PHARMAC Advisory Groups
a. These groups include the COVID-19 Treatments Advisory Group (ad hoc); COVID-19 Therapeutics Technical Advisory Group; Remdesivir COVID-19 Advisory Group Remdesivir COVID-19 Advisory Group (Ad hoc); Tocilizumab Advisory Group (ad hoc); Critical Care Advisory Group (ad hoc); Expert Advisory Group for long COVID.
b. These groups appear to be focussed on approval and introduction of new treatments, and on the results of trials relating to individual new treatments. These groups do not appear to have reported on the changing profile in the scientific literature in order to identify new knowledges concerning the evidence on existing medicines and nutritional treatments that have been commonly used for prevention or treatment of any of the complex conditions that arise following injecting by mRNA genetic vaccines or following the respiratory infection Sars-Cov-2.
33. COVID-19 Modelling Aotearoa
a. This platform, which appears to be led by Te Pūnaha Matatini and Auckland University, is focussed on modelling. Modelling scenarios have not allowed for vaccine failure, waning, nor considered age stratified risk of hospitalisation and death, nor proportionality.
b. No reviews of the scientific literature have been undertaken to identify knew knowledges concerning the evidence on existing medicines and nutritional treatments that have been commonly used for prevention or treatment of any of the complex conditions that arise following injecting by mRNA genetic vaccines or following the respiratory infection Sars-Cov-2. Funding has been secured through the DPMC and the MBIE.
a. Medicines Adverse Reactions Committee (MARC). No reports or reviews of the scientific literature have been presented concerning the safety of any drugs involved in COVID-19 (vaccination, or clinical treatment).
b. Vaccine Safety Monitoring Process – while the protocols state that both the COVID-19 monitoring process and the Medsafe Vaccine Safety monitoring processes review the scientific literature to investigate potential COVID-19 safety signals, there is no evidence rolling reviews of the scientific literature have been undertaken.
35. The Prime Ministers Chief Science Advisor
a. No work has been undertaken to review the scientific literature in order to identify knew knowledges concerning the evidence on existing medicines and nutritional treatments that have been commonly used for prevention or treatment of any of the complex conditions that arise following injecting by mRNA genetic vaccines or following the respiratory infection Sars-Cov-2.
[C] OFFICIAL INFORMATION ACT REQUEST
There is no evidence that any team or advisory group is tasked to review the scientific literature on issues of relevance to the COVID-19 pandemic.
36. Age stratified risk. Please disclose all meeting minutes and reports held with your Ministry/Department, or with the Hon Chris Hipkins, discussing age stratified risk in relation to safety of the mRNA genetic vaccines; and relevant cost-benefit analyses are undertaken at each strata. This includes all work undertaken by Medsafe and provided to your institution. This is important as it relates to the principle of proportionality, and of do no harm, an established principle of public health.
37. Scholarly literature. Which groups in your Ministry/Department are specifically tasked with ongoing surveillance/reviews; or were engaged to provide surveillance/reviews to the Hon Chris Hipkins as the Minister of Covid-19 response; specifically to supply reporting and feedback relating information held in the published international scientific literature as knowledge changes over the COVID-19 event. This includes all work undertaken by Medsafe and provided to your institution. Please advise for each category:
a. The changing profile (virulence and pathogenicity) of Sars-Cov-2 respiratory virus;
b. New evidence relating to the symptoms of COVID-19 (thrombotic and cardiac/heart, viral; autoimmune, neuropathic etc), by
i. age group,
iii. for pregnant women; and by
iv. health status;
c. Evidence on safety and efficacy of mRNA genetic vaccines by age group, by gender, for pregnant women and by health status. This would emphasise data on the potential for the mRNA genetic vaccines boosters to prevent hospitalisation and death over the course of the COVID-19 event;
d. Evidence on the safety and efficacy of mRNA genetic vaccines, particularly in relation to potential accumulation of the spike protein that can persist beyond 6 months (by age, gender, and health status) concerning:
i. mRNA vaccination post infection with Sars-Cov-2
ii. Ongoing exposure to boosters
e. Data in (a) and (b) would include reviews of the potential for the mRNA genetic vaccines to: induce clotting, promote autoimmune responses, to reactivate latent viruses, to induce Mast Cell Activation Syndrome, and impair mitochondrial function.
f. Increased risk of vaccine-associated enhanced disease (VAED);
g. Emerging data on biodistribution, particularly to the brain and
h. Evidence on the role of natural immunity;
i. Evidence assessing the cost-benefit ratio of possible safe and low-cost alternatives to mRNA genetic vaccines to prevent hospitalisation and death from COVID-19 for at risk groups. This includes early ambulatory treatments using repurposed drugs and nutrients with a long history of safe use;
j. Evidence on safety and efficacy of clinical guidelines for hospitalised patients, and the evidence for off-patent and repurposed drugs and nutrients with a long history of safe use;
k. Data exploring potential for excess population level mortality (as opposed to mortality directly resulting from COVID-19);
l. Risk from the genetic code being installed in the body (including in the immune cells and monocytes) and the persistence of this genetic code and risk to population health.
m. Post-vaccine treatments to advance healing from adverse reactions.
(Note: original OIA request for  contains an incorrectly lettered list)
38. Transparency relating to methodologies. Please direct me to the protocols and methodologies used by groups in your Ministry/Department/Office in section [B] when conducting literature reviews of the peer reviewed scientific literature (as per question (31); and when carrying out the Science Updates. This includes all work undertaken by Medsafe and provided to your institution.
39. Resourcing for reviews of the scholarly literature. Please supply budgetary documents from within your Ministry/Department, or to Hon Chris Hipkins, to demonstrate that resourcing has been arranged so that flexible, rolling reviews of the scientific literature have been provided for. This includes budgets for such work undertaken by Medsafe and provided to your institution.
40. Long COVID. Ministry of Health and Minister for COVID-19 Response, does the scope of the Long COVID Expert Advisory Group include a requirement that the group conduct ongoing surveillance and reporting of the scientific literature on early treatments which may prevent hospitalisation and death and may play a role in limiting long Covid?
41. Mandated vaccines. Please direct me to the literature reviews, meeting minutes and reports held with your Ministry/Department or held by the Hon Chris Hipkins that have been produced by the COVID-19 Vaccine Strategy Taskforce updating and detailing the changing safety and efficacy profile of vaccines which have been recently listed as booster doses in New Zealand in this Order: COVID-19 Public Health Response (Vaccinations) Amendment Order (No 4) 2022 (Schedule 4) dated 15 May 2022. The purpose of this order is to prevent, and limit the risk of, the outbreak or spread of COVID-19 by requiring certain work to be carried out by affected persons who are vaccinated and have received a booster dose.
a. This includes safety and efficacy information stratified to age, gender and pregnancy status.
b. This includes deliberation and reasoning for mandatory vaccines and boosters when the mRNA vaccine does not prevent transmission.
c. This includes all work undertaken by Medsafe and provided to your institution.
42. Consultation and numbers needed to treat. This was a major consideration in the role out to children. ‘The number needed to treat (NNT) for a vaccine is interpreted as the average number of people who need to be vaccinated to prevent one additional adverse outcome from the disease. It is calculated as 1/(incidence in unvaccinated – incidence in vaccinated).’ Please supply documents and reports from your Ministry/ Department as follows:
a. Discussion/meeting minutes/reports on how NNT and risk – and reports and documents on whether NNT should be judged based on infection; or be based on hospitalisation and death infection rates.
b. Rolling reporting over the course of the pandemic to reflect the changing risk profile of variants as they become more transmissible and pose less risk to the not at-risk groups.
c. Data demonstrating NNT and risk profile of hospitalisation and death by age group, for example – 5-11 year olds; 12-15 year olds; 16-40 year olds; 40-65 year olds; 65 year olds and above.
d. This includes all work undertaken by Medsafe and provided to your institution.
43. Vaccination in pregnancy. Please direct me to literature reviews, meeting minutes and reports held with your Ministry/ Department or held by the Hon Chris Hipkins concerning:
a. Reviews of the scientific literature been undertaken since September 2021? Please provide this information, the author information and the methodology for this review.
a. Please provide the methodology for the 13 September 2021 COVID-19 science update on vaccination in pregnancy and risk of miscarriage, and advise the authors.
b. Please provide the evidence for reasoning on the cost benefit ratio for healthy pregnant women accepting the mRNA vaccine versus women with multiple health conditions.
c. This includes all work undertaken by Medsafe and provided to your institution/office.
44. Clinical management of COVID-19 (Including in pregnancy). Clinical guidelines have been produced. As COVID-19 is a complex condition and co-treatments are common, this reduces the potential for randomised control trials to be the sole source of evidence. Please direct me to the literature reviews of the scientific literature that formed the basis for this document.
a. If this is unavailable, please provide the meeting minutes, emails and reports that formed the background to this document.
45. Children and young people. This paper was published before data on Omicron was available, therefore it is presumed that review of the scientific literature on risk to children will have been undertaken in support of policy. Please supply literature reviews, meeting minutes and reports held with your Ministry/ Department or by the Hon Chris Hipkins regarding:
a. Information from the scientific literature or your Ministry/Agency/Department confirming this fact for children under 18 over the course of the pandemic or refuting it: ‘The risk of hospitalisation and death from COVID-19 is similar or even higher than the pre-vaccine-era of other diseases for which vaccines are routinely given’. ( In Request for advice: COVID-19 and vaccination in 5-11 year olds. Page 23. Ref: Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), ACIP Evidence to Recommendations for Use of Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine under an Emergency Use Authorization. 2021.
b. Specifically relating to reviews in ages 0-12 years. Please direct me to all rolling reviews of the scientific literature undertaken by your Ministry/Agency/Department to demonstrate that your Ministry/Agency/Department is closely following the science with regards to infants and children age 0-12 years, concerning risk from Sars-Cov-2 infection, consequent risk from hospitalisation and death and potential alternatives to the COVID-19 vaccine.
c. Please supply all literature reviews your Ministry/Agency/Department looking at the cost benefit ratio of vaccinating under 40’s and myocarditis/pericarditis risk.
d. This request includes all work undertaken by Medsafe and provided to your institution/office.
 References for early treatments.
McCullough, P.A. et al. (2020) Multifaceted highly targeted sequential multidrug treatment.
Association of American Physicians and Surgeons. Physician List & Guide to Home-Based COVID Treatment.
Canadian Covid Care Alliance. Early Treatment Protocols.
World Council for Health. Early Covid-19 treatment guidelines: A practical approach to home-based care for healthy families.
Front Line COVID-19 Critical Care Alliance. Prevention & Treatment Protocols for COVID-19.
Alexander P.E. et al. (2021). Early ambulatory outpatient sequenced antiviral multidrug COVID-19 treatment (including for Delta or similar variants) for high-risk children and adolescents