DON'T MAKE BIRD FLU A PLUCKING DISASTER
Don't lock-step follow 'accepted practice internationally'. Don't conflate high infectivity with a high death rate. If New Zealand is blind to the facts, we sentence Kiwi owned farms to death.
NB: Please contact me if I have made wrong or incorrect statements.
Historically farmers with avian influenza would let the infection run through their sheds and let the birds and animals develop natural immunity. The USA has just learnt a big lesson, they culled 166 million to ‘stamp out’ H5N1 and now they’ve changed tactic. Avian influenza is traditionally mild in chickens. The threat isn’t the virulence (speed of transmission) but the potential to kill.
HPAI strains are a cause for concern, sheds must have impeccable hygiene and biosecurity controls, but there is no need to blindly cull. Yes, some markets will require their imported products to be from a country free of HPAI and exporters must adhere to individual country standards. MPI reported that since the December 2024 operation in Otago, 65 percent of affected trade has been recovered so far.
High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) was detected in New Zealand in December 2024. MPI stated that:
The H7N6 strain is closely related to LPAI strains present in wild birds in New Zealand.
LPAI has been present in wild bird populations in New Zealand for decades and many species of wild birds may have strains of the virus. Internationally, over 5,000 species of wild birds have this type of avian influenza.
LPAI causes few or no signs of illness in wild birds. However, when a low pathogenicity strain of avian influenza is introduced to chickens, it can mutate into a high pathogenicity strain.
Testing indicates that the infection at the Hillgrove farm happened after free-range laying hens foraging outside were exposed to the low pathogenicity virus from wild birds, which then mutated in the hens to become HPAI. It was the first detection of HPAI in New Zealand.
How did the virus naturally mutate into a high pathogenicity strain? If this is correct, the most likely reason may be stress. Poultry and egg farmers are fanatical about the quality of their feed because high performing poultry need exact nutrient and energy requirement to maintain immune health, avoid disease and maintain productivity.
We do know that good can people make mistakes. There’s a story in the industry that once someone at a feed supplier put the wrong decimal place in on the weighing instrument for carotene. The eggs ended up being green! What if key dietary ingredients such as amino acids were at the wrong level? So much can go wrong. Getting to the bottom of this involves deep trust, with our businesses confident that MPI isn’t going to walk around swinging sledgehammers.
H5N1
New Zealand authorities are reportedly waiting for HPAI H5N1 to land on New Zealand shores via, most likely bird migration. New Zealand poultry farmers have been advised that once H5N1 is endemic in New Zealand, there will be no compensation.
Since 2020, the HPAI H5N1 2.3.4.4b clade has been reported in Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America. MPI repeatedly referred to this clade in their communications. In May 2024 RNZ did an ‘anxiety’ piece on the transmissibility of H5N1 to mammals. No shit sherlock. H5N1 is known to infect at least 450 different animal species.
But is a declaration of HPAI a death wish for our plucky chickens AND their farmers?
‘HIGH PATHOGENICITY’
High pathogenicity means the potential for an agent to spread quickly and cause disease, another word for this is virulence. This 2007 paper by Swain stated:
Overall, such pathobiological features vary with host species and virus strain. Experimentally, HPAI viruses typically produce a similar severe, systemic disease with high mortality in chickens and other gallinaceous birds. However, these same viruses usually produce no clinical signs of infection or only mild disease in domestic ducks and wild birds. Over the past decade, the emergent HPAI viruses have shifted to increased virulence for chickens as evident by shorter mean death times and a greater propensity for massive disseminated replication in vascular endothelial cells.
Just because a virus reaches our shores, this does not automatically translate to a high mortality rate (whether of poultry or humans). Humans have a very low mortality rate from avian influenza. We need to demand transparency and discretion from authorities who scarily imply high death rates in humans following infection with avian influenza. Note bene: If authorities only count the people who die from influenza as people who are the elderly and infirm, and/or people who have multiple morbidities diagnosed with infection, and then divide that by deaths, that is a misleading figure on the real death rate. This may be what is happening with human mortality estimates from avian influenza. Asymptomatic transmission can be completely ignored.
In December MPI told us that they’re going to ‘stamp out’ HPAI H7N6. A virus that doesn’t kill humans, and for which we still don’t know the mortality rate in NZ.
… MEANWHILE IN THE USA - THEY COULDN’T ‘STAMP OUT’ H5N1
US authorities first detected HPAI H5N1 in 2022. Authorities commenced a national cull to attempt to stem the virus. The Biden administration released $2 billion to support the cull and compensate farmers. This didn’t work and H5N1 spread to 50 states.
166 million birds have been culled and US farmers have been compensated to some extent. H5N1 has cycled and recycled in naïve flocks. The virus has not been permitted to die down naturally. H5N1 continues to be detected with USA authorities confirming some 12,000 cases of HPAI in wild birds to date.
On December 18, Newsweek reported that the week prior, a Louisiana person who was older than 65, with underlying medical condition was hospitalized in critical condition with severe respiratory symptoms from a bird flu infection. The patient had been in contact with sick and dead birds in a backyard flock.
This appears to have been the tipping point for California Governor Gavin Newsom to declare a State of Emergency on December 18. At that stage 34 cases of bird flu (H5N1), but no human deaths had been recorded. Most cases were in California. There was no disclosure of mortality rates in poultry.
Some 10,000 cases in dairy cows have since been reported. H5N1 doesn’t represent a death risk for dairy cows and workers appear to be most at risk of conjunctivitis.
In February the new Trump administration and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) changed course with a $1 billion strategy, largely in response to high egg prices. The course change involves stricter biosecurity measures with the USDA sharing:
up to 75% of the costs to fix the highest risk biosecurity concerns identified by the assessments and audits, with a total available investment of up to $500 million.
The USDA is not overtly discussing the role of natural immunity in moving the US flock forward. However, this is the implicit suggestion, with the agency rolling back from aggressive culling and acknowledging that vaccines haven’t been demonstrated to be sterile, i.e. they don’t stop transmission of infection in poultry.
In a Breitbart interview on March 8, 2025, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Secretary Brooke Rollins acknowledged the
‘what I learned is that looking at countries like Mexico that actually do vaccinate their egg-layers is that those chickens have to be stuck three or four or five times with those vaccine shots and then 80 to 83 percent of those chickens still get the avian bird flu. So I pulled that off the table and for a lot of reasons we are not going to be moving off the table on mandatory vaccines now or frankly ever.’
Rollins continued:
“The avian flu is extremely pathogenic—pathogenic is the right word for it. It’s transmitted through wild fowl,” Rollins said. “So let’s say a wild goose flies over your egg-laying barn, and then defecates—then someone steps in that and then walks into the barn. All of a sudden you’ve got an avian flu case that is so—it spreads like wildfire. So once the barns though are locked down with proper ventilation, the roofs are patched, the walls are put up, then you’ve significantly decreased your chances of having any of that in your barn. That allows you to keep laying the eggs and keep feeding your state, the country, and the world frankly. When we say biosecurity, that’s what we mean—locking the barns down, patching the holes, making sure the fowl don’t get in, but also looking potentially at how we breed chickens to have stronger immune systems so that maybe the ones that aren’t getting sick instead of killing the whole herd so we can potentially do something. We do have some farmers out there right now that are piloting that. Instead of mass culling and the USDA basically telling you to put your whole barn down, how can we be creative and innovative in solving this big issue right now?”
Rollins then discussed 150 pilot projects where barns were locked down, the government paid for 75% of the locking down, and only one case of avian flu had been detected across the 150 premises in the project.
Later in March, following a question by Politico, Rollins agreed with
‘Kennedy’s assertion that vaccinating poultry against avian influenza would “turn those flocks into mutation factories”
UNDERSTANDING MPI’S REASONING FOR ORDERING THE CULL
MPI have not been forthcoming with information. A December 5, 2024 Official Information Act request made by the Reality Check Radio breakfast team (OIA24-0914) was not answered until April 14, 2025.
As at 3 December 2024, 35 samples had been taken from the affected property, and 94 percent of these had returned positive results for high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI). Please note that a given bird may be represented in multiple samples.
MPI does not record which specific birds within the shed were sampled or how many birds are represented in the samples, so the number of birds that tested positive for the H7N6 strain of HPAI is not known
Only 35 samples, the hens didn’t appear to be tagged, and so one bird may have been represented in multiple samples. What?
PCR tests were run at between 20 and 45 cycles, but there was no declaration at what threshold detections started at. It’s fairly well known that thresholds above 35 can lead to false positives, and PCR tests are not recognised as perfect, in part, I believe because there is little capacity for these tests to determine if genetic sample comes from a live virus or a dead particle.
No scientific analysis laying out data clearly was provided. No scientist has communicated the data for media and the public.
Without transparency we now know that cases and infection counts can be used as a fear tactic, to corral people into following pre-prescribed policies.
In the OIA24-0914 MPI stated:
‘it is accepted practice internationally where outbreaks happen to depopulate flocks to stop the spread of the virus to other birds and reduce exposure to people.’
What if HPAI is in a flock but only 20% of the flock die, and the rest recover? Is that fair on the farmer, that the entire flock is culled? Is it fair on consumers who then face egg shortages, and egg prices hikes?
Word on the street is that perhaps only 6,000 had died out of 80,000. Would this have made the strain a low pathogen avian influenza (LPAI)?
MPI state that it is ‘accepted practice’ - but as New Zealanders on an island continent, we can demand far more accountability, and less haste. MPI stated ‘If birds are not depopulated, the virus will spread.’ Yes of course, but as the U.S. was showing us for the last 5 years, the virus will spread anyway.
We can’t understand lethality if we cull flocks. We can follow historic practice and lock-down farms until the wave of infection has passed. We’ve seen far too much delegation to offshore ‘wisdom’ in the past 5 years - and that ‘wisdom’ isn’t scientifically justified.
Allegedly, some $20 million may have been involved as compensation to Mainland Farms in Otago for having to carry out the cull. Mainland Farms are a good operator, and they did what MPI told them to do.
Questions for MPI:
Was there established scientific evidence that the death rate would be high?
What was the mortality rate that the ‘accepted practice’ was based on?
What was the mortality rate for the Otago sheds?
Did MPI discuss the mortality rate and the severity with the owners of the Otago sheds?
Does MPI know that infection with a low pathogenic avian influenza provides effective protection against infection and mortality caused by HPAI virus?
What work has MPI done to highlight the uncertainty of a mortality rate once a virus ends up in New Zealand after circulating the globe?
Farmers are like epidemiologists - they can study watch a virus move through the population. They can understand virulence, they can gain an approximation of the extent of morbidity and mortality. Farmers talk, they network. Veterinarians chat. The neighbour looks over the fence. They network and attend industry zoom calls. No one wants to spread a high-mortality virus and ‘word’ will get out in industry. We need to listen to farmers, and respect their advice and wisdom.
Perhaps, if HPAI is virulent, in a well-run, clean shed, with good nutrition, there may be a low death rate. Perhaps if a low pathogenicity strain has been through the shed, the death rate will be even more minor.
MPI does not have scientists who are experts in poultry and avian influenza responding to press releases. We can trust our poultry farmers.
I’d love it if pre-2019 advice for poultry and egg farmers on infectious disease management, and the history of high mortality events were up on the Poultry Industry Association of New Zealand (PIANZ) web pages, so that new industry entrants and the public had some idea about how common these events are and historically, how these events were managed.
Where are the scientists doing real research working with real farmers?
MPI uses unscientific language like ‘stamping out H7N6’. Yet there is real potential for symptomatic and asymptomatic transmission. I don’t want Kiwi owned businesses to be ruined if MPI is chasing a virus that doesn’t have a high death rate. Yet they will, if HPAI viruses that are endemic in the population, and MPI forces every farmer with an infected shed to cull their flocks no matter the mortality data.
I’ve been on teams working in sheds culling poultry at the end of life. Your lungs get filled up with feather filaments, your eyes get itchy. MPI advised that letting a virus spread through a flock is ‘an animal welfare concern’ and that the flocks were humanely culled. What does this involve to make it humane?
There is no doubt that automatically culling an entire flock where most of the flock would have recovered and lived if we had isolated the farm and stood back to understand the mortality rate - is an animal welfare concern.
Culling flocks also puts the farmers/workers at high risk of infections. We know that it is mainly a form of conjunctivitis or pink eye. That is not fun, but you don’t have to start working out your favourite funeral music.
THE ROAD TO BUSINESS FAILS & CORPORATE BUYOUTS.
If MPI demands automatic culls no matter the death rate, this will kill locally owned businesses, and likely be a big win for off-shore corporates with more equity to whether storms.
If a farm can be shut down any month - what bank will give that farmer a loan? To start a business, update farm equipment, and even, ironically, to improve hygiene? What will happen to the cost of insurance? Currently, the average shed is probably spending a quarter of a million dollars on biosecurity alone. Are the costs of biosecurity able to be absorbed, or does this become another tipping point for New Zealand owned businesses?
Farmers I know, know that if they went belly up, a large Chinese multinational will snap them up straight away. I’m not sure if NZ owned business is part of MPI’s calculation.
The truth is - the capacity for Kiwi owned business to survive HPAI should be a key calculation. Any official weighing risk from HPAI under the Biosecurity Act 1993 (see some links and content at the bottom of this article) should be considering that smaller businesses have far less capacity to endure a downturn than a large corporation with massive equity. It is reasonable that they do this. It is also reasonable that we do not automatically lock-step follow overseas processes because, as the U.S. kill craze has demonstrated, offshore plans can go asunder.
TRANSPARENCY AT EVERY STAGE FOR POULTRY/EGG PRODUCERS
I want to know exactly what guidelines and what data makes a virus an ‘HPAI’ virus - and the work our authorities go to, to establish the pathogen of concern reflects those characteristics.
MPI should have an obligation to publish these plans and the data supporting them, prior to any cull order. Organisations that have to cull should never be required to sign non-disclosure agreements.
Is it this 2000 standard? Swain and Suarez (Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory, Agricultural Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture) defining high pathogenicity in 2000:
a) any influenza virus that is lethal for six, seven or eight of eight (>75%) four- to six-week-old susceptible chickens within ten days following intravenous inoculation with 0.2 ml of a 1:10 dilution of a bacteria-free, infectious allantoic fluid; b) any H5 or H7 virus that does not meet the criteria in a), but has an amino acid sequence at the HA cleavage site that is compatible with HPAI viruses; c) any influenza virus that is not an H5 or H7 subtype and that kills one to five of eight inoculated chickens and grows in cell culture in the absence of trypsin.
(The cleavage site is emphasised as the cleavability of the haemagglutinin (HA) protein was identified as the major determinant of virulence in HPAI viruses in 1979.)
Or has it been updated? Perhaps cleavability of HA doesn’t always amount to a high death rate in mater populations? Who knows?! Where is that information for New Zealand businesses?
Because of the threat to the survival of businesses, all poultry (including egg) producers should be able to see all steps of every pest management plan and assess whether MPI has taken into account - and understands the mortality rate.
THE VACCINE RISK - IMMUNE ESCAPE/DISEASE ENHANCEMENT
The ‘mutation factory’ statement by Kennedy that Rollins quoted relates to the risk of antibody dependent enhancement. Antibody dependent enhancement is an old problem, where antibodies can enhance virus entry and replication in cells is an ‘unavoidable problem’ for vaccine developers.
‘Influenza viruses are known to undergo a process called antigenic drift, whereby they continuously change their antigenic and genetic properties.’
Kennedy has done the research. Vaccination can enhance antibody dependent enhancement (ADE) and is a major impediment to vaccine research. Very basically, the disease is ‘enhanced’ - the virus binds to suboptimal antibodies, allowing the virus to get into immune cells and replicate. As Wikipedia notes: if the virus is not neutralized, antibody binding may result in virus escape and, therefore, more severe infection. This is more likely to happen if a vaccine’s efficacy wanes, or if the subject is immunocompromised.
A Singapore/U.S. study by Yao-Tsun Li et al (2021) showed it’s impossible to determine if vaccines will make things better or worse for farmers over a period of time:
‘nationwide control measures, including vaccination in China, successfully suppressed H5N1 populations in poultry, providing an opportunity for antigenically distinct H5Nx viruses to emerge. In particular, we show that the widespread use of H5N1 vaccines likely conferred a fitness advantage to H5Nx viruses due to the antigenic mismatch of the neuraminidase genes.’
A study by BingYing Li et al (2025) looking at H5 HPAI viruses from 1996-2023 found that movements from wild birds to unvaccinated populations were more frequent than movements into vaccinated populations - but that H5 in vaccinated populations evolved more quickly in more ways.
The HA [hemagglutinin] gene of the AIV lineage that circulated predominately among Chinese poultry with high vaccination coverage underwent faster evolution and greater nonsynonymous divergence than other lineages.
It’s not just a risk for H5 - it’s a broad-spectrum risk. A study on the H7N9 strain acknowledged that immune escape mutations could arise via vaccination or natural infection.
The continued circulation of the virus in birds carrying virus-neutralizing antibodies induced through vaccination or natural exposure drives viruses to evolve and escape from the immune pressure.
If we talk about humans, for example, prior to the release of the COVID-19 mRNA gene therapy, Pfizer and BioNTech (page 44) identified vaccine-associated enhanced disease including vaccine-associated enhanced respiratory disease as an important potential risk.
VAED is thought to occur by several mechanisms where the immune response is not fully protective and actually either causes the body to have an inflammatory reaction due to the type of immune response with specific types of T-cells, or the body does not produce enough strong antibodies to prevent SARS-CoV-2 infection of cells or produces weak antibodies that actually bind to the virus and help it to enter cells more easily, leading to worse signs of disease. (Medsafe (2022, Feb 27). Updated summary of risk management plan for Comirnaty)
Vaccine-derived immunity particularly from new biologic drugs like the COVID products is far less certain than protection from natural immunity, which is derived through more durable T-cell and B-cell responses.
The risk is a vaccine treadmill with naturally seasonal mutations being layered with vaccine-derived mutations. Vaccination is a financial cost, but there can be side effects, and it’s well recognised that natural immunity is more durable.
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES INCREASE LIKELIHOOD OF AN EVENT
The risk of a harmful pathogen is vastly amplified by the preponderance of labs and global failures to meaningfully regulate and prevent gain-of-function research. There is a global ‘boom’ in biolab construction, most biolabs are in cities with more than half of the biolabs working with animals being based in the U.S.. Biorisk management and oversight has not kept up with the pace of operation of these labs.
Laboratory acquired infections (LAI) and accidental pathogen escape from laboratories (APELs) are relatively common:
‘Of the 309 individual LAI cases, most occurred in North America (n=243, 78·6%), followed by Europe (n=28, 9·1%) and Asia (n=23, 7·4%), with the majority of the reports originating from the USA… procedural errors represented the leading cause of LAIs, accounting for 69·3% of cases. 16 APELS incidents were reported between 2000 and 2021 that involved bacterial (n=6, 37·5%) and viral (n=10, 62·5%) pathogens.
If scientists are paid to do research, they will. Gain-of-function (GoF), or serial passage research is undertaken to increase the transmissibility and virulence of pathogens. The U.S. stopped funding GoF and imposed a moratorium in 2014. This was lifted in 2017. Evidence has now surfaced that instead of stopping research, the U.S. GoF experiments and work shifted to China.
Gain-of-function research is ‘dual use’ research. While the claim is that GoF has been essential for vaccine development, and to enable developers to deal with nastier strains of a pathogen, there is increasing evidence that unintentional and intentional laboratory escapes of harmful pathogens may amplify the policy environment for government to build vaccine mandates into policy, and increase financial returns. This appears to be the case with COVID-19.
In a recent paper Hulscher et al (2024) postulate that genetic evidence suggested geographic proximity of outbreaks with labs conducting GoF or serial passage research. H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b was first detected in the Netherlands in October 2020. In 2012 at the Erasmus Medical centre in Rotterdam, Wang Y et al (2012) had modified H5N1 to become airborne transmissible in ferrets. Wang et al went on to publish his laboratory methods for genetically manipulating H5N1, so that this work could be replicated.
Has Hulscher et al discuss, Wang et al had previously closely collaborated with the USDA Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory (SEPRL) in Athens Georgia on H9 avian influenza viruses. SEPRL was conducting serial passage experiments in Mallard ducks from April 2021, and a new H5N1 subtype was detected in Georgia in January 2022.
NATIONAL AUTHORITIES WITH FINANCIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
MPI referred to the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH) who seems to be an authority. Yet who funds the WOAH? The WOAH acknowledges funding partners include philanthropic funds and non-government organisations.
We’re seeing convergence where health authorities that we should be able to trust, have financial and political conflicts of interest. It is well established that the World Health Organization is heavily funded by organisations with extensive financial ties with the pharmaceutical and vaccine development industries.
The problem is amplified when health authorities profit from vaccine investment and development. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, owns nearly 5,000 patents, and awarded $590 mill in Moderna’s bird flu vaccine development. The CDC which was in 2014 advocating for performing experiments on H5N1 for ‘pandemic preparedness’ makes money from licensing.
Even MPI is in on the game, going halvies with a bunch of our monopoly organisations to theoretically develop what could become mandated medications to lower methane.
It’s all a bit too murky.
What is the answer? Grounding decisions in local science, local evidence, and transparent collegiality between our poultry and egg producers and MPI. Increasing basic science research for independent researchers (not MPI) so that with the next emergency, MPI isn’t the font of all knowledge, but gets away with deferring to offshore ‘rules’ because we haven’t funded the science to have the expertise.
Unfortunately, MBIE doesn’t currently fund that sort of science because their priority is on patent development, known as innovation.
End.
PLEASE: Let me know if any of the above statements are incorrect. Happy to edit.
THE BIOSECURITY ACT 1993
Section 22 of the Act mandates that, before implementing a pest management plan, the responsible Minister must be satisfied that the benefits of the plan outweigh the costs. This includes considerations related to protecting domestic food production, public health, and the environment.
61 First step: plan initiated by proposal
(1)The first step in the making of a plan is a proposal made by—
(a)a Minister; or
(b)a person who submits the proposal to a Minister.
(2)The proposal must set out the following matters:
(a)the name of the person making the proposal:
(b)the subject of the proposal, which means—
(i)the organism proposed to be specified as a pest under the plan or the organisms proposed to be specified as pests under the plan; or
(ii)the class or description of organism proposed to be specified as a pest under the plan or the classes or descriptions of organisms proposed to be specified as pests under the plan:
(c)for each subject,—
(i)a description of its adverse effects:
(ii)the reasons for proposing a plan:
(iii)the objectives that the plan would have:
(iv)the principal measures that would be in the plan to achieve the objectives:
(v)other measures that it would be reasonable to take to achieve the objectives, if there are any such measures, and the reasons why the proposed measures are preferable as a means of achieving the objectives:
(vi)the reasons why a national plan is more appropriate than a regional plan:
(vii)an analysis of the benefits and costs of the plan:
(viii)the extent to which any persons, or persons of a class or description, are likely to benefit from the plan:
(ix)the extent to which any persons, or persons of a class or description, contribute to the creation, continuance, or exacerbation of the problems proposed to be resolved by the plan:
(x)the rationale for the proposed allocation of costs:
(xi)if it is proposed that the plan be funded by a levy under section 100L, how the proposed levy satisfies section 100L(5)(d) and what matters will be specified under section 100N(1):
(xii)whether any unusual administrative problems or costs are expected in recovering the costs allocated to any of the persons whom the plan would require to pay the costs:
(d)any other organism intended to be controlled:
(e)the effects that, in the opinion of the person making the proposal, implementation of the plan would have on—
(i)economic wellbeing, the environment, human health, enjoyment of the natural environment, and the relationship between Māori, their culture, and their traditions and their ancestral lands, waters, sites, wāhi tapu, and taonga:
(ii)the marketing overseas of New Zealand products:
See further: Biosecurity Act 1993
National pest management plans
59Definitions for sections 60 to 6760Relationship of rules and plan with law
61First step: plan initiated by proposal
62Second step: satisfaction on requirements
63Third step: satisfaction with consultation or requirement of more consultation
64Fourth step: approval of preparation of plan and decision on management agency
65Fifth step: satisfaction on contents of plan and requirements
Regional pest management plans
68Definitions for sections 69 to 78
69Relationship of rules with law
70First step: plan initiated by proposal
71Second step: satisfaction on requirements
72 Third step: satisfaction with consultation or requirement of more consultation
73Fourth step: approval of preparation of plan and decision on management agency
74Fifth step: satisfaction on contents of plan and requirements
75Sixth step: decision on plan
Are you aware of Christine Massey's "germ" FOI Newsletter regarding lack of proof of alleged viruses?
These two posts are relevant:-
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada confesses re bird flu hoax: we have zero evidence of a virus or contagion
https://christinemasseyfois.substack.com/p/agriculture-and-agri-food-canada
Scottish Government confesses to having no scientific evidence of any bird flu virus
https://christinemasseyfois.substack.com/p/scottish-government-confesses-to
Thank you for covering this.